According to Jacques Derrida in his book, Of Grammatology (1967), the binary oppositions in thought, such as subject versus object (nature versus society, active versus passive etc.) are assumed to have a hierarchy in which one of the terms is more powerful. Derrida uses an example of the binary opposition found between speech/writing but asserts that there is no stable hierarchy, as speech/writing makes an unfounded destabilising play between the two. As Derrida states:

Derrida argues that writing has been considered as merely a derivative form of speech. Critiquing this relationship between speech and writing, Derrida suggests that written symbols are legitimate signifiers on their own—that they should not be considered as secondary or derivative in relation to oral speech. This hierarchical ideology between speech and writing can be traced back to the impacts of colonialism,[2] as western colonisers tended to only recognise written languages that had a phonic alphabet. Therefore, the colonised peoples had to learn the coloniser’s language to gain access to power. Frantz Fanon describes this power relation, in Black Skin White Masks (1952), ‘…a man who has a language consequently possesses the world expressed and implied by that language. What we are getting at becomes plain: Mastery of language affords remarkable power.’[3] Fanon is highlighting that the colonized body has to think and operate within the language of power (colonizer) in order to access that power and, therefore, to decolonise requires a change in this power relation. As a result of the colonial power relation, other modes of language and, as we think through language, other modes of thought were written over (colonised) and lost. Walter D. Mignolo declares in Cultural Studies (2007) that, ‘De-linking requires analysis of the making and re-making of the imperial and colonial differences and it requires visions and strategies for the implementation of border thinking leading to de-colonisation of knowledge and of being.’[4] Mignolo’s idea of de-linking and changing the terms of the conversation, aims to fracture the dominance of colonial forms of knowledge and understanding (which still rule our current systems) to reconstitute other ways of thinking, speaking, living and being in the world.

The operation of this power relation is still very prominent within art practices and museum display strategies to this day. Subsequently to the museological models originally introduced by the Louvre and MoMA, visitors in museums and galleries have formed a habit of reading the descriptive label about the work in order to understand an art object. The museum’s omnipresent knowledge and understanding (coloniser’s language) suggests to visitors, through what is often interpreted as a neutral voice (coloniser), to believe that they are on the correct path to understanding the artwork. I aim to follow Mignolo’s idea of de-linking within the context of the artwork’s relationship to language, by de-linking from the dominant model for interpreting art and building up a subjective and experiential understanding of looking at and perceiving things.

In Derrida’s, Of Grammatology (1967) he assesses Saussure’s linguistic structuralism by starting with a quote by Saussure, ‘…language and writing are two distinct systems of signs; the second exists for the sole purpose of representing the first.’[5]Saussure claims that writing is secondary to speech. In contrast, Derrida questions whether speech can be created before and after writing. He concludes that speech will always need its written text to assist and preserve itself in the present. Simultaneously, he asserts that writing can exist independently of speech. Derrida declares that speech itself is also a sign; speech and writing can be both absent and present, so they do not need to simultaneously be heard/read side by side. Therefore, the hierarchy associated with speech and writing is undone through the ambiguity and autonomy of their positions. Derrida claims that context is unbounded, ‘If meaning is related to context, there is, with respect to the very structure of language, no proper context to provide proof of a final meaning.’[6] Both signified and signifier are related and irrevocably detached but this also means that words, phrases and sentences are able to be repeated in different contexts. Derrida critiques Saussure’s ides of signs and instead suggests that they are not only two-sided but also over-lapping. In Derrida’s thinking, the binary opposition has been deconstructed and this, ‘… has suggested a method in which we can subvert these oppositions only by showing that one of the opposite terms can only exist within another.’[7] As a result, the structures in language themselves begin to overlap and clash. For example, the binary oppositions of presence/absence and speech/writing are relational, as they can only express themselves in relation to the other. Each term in the relation is generated through the other and the one needs the other to prove its inverse existence. This overlapping shows that there is a co-dependent relationship of one relying on the other. In the signifier and signified, the two-sided and over-lapping relationships are similar to the colonial construct as highlighted by Mignolo. The colonial position relies on the binary relationship it has constructed with the colonised to assert and affirm its power.

It is through the habitual behavior of rehearsal and repetition that humans have constructed generic objects. Human behaviour is often viewed as unusual because we can act and interact while having the ability to analyse each act. The contradiction between human naming (dominating) and the thing that is named (object), can be extrapolated through Derrida’s term, ‘Logic of Supplementarity’.[8] Through the Logic of Supplementarity, Derrida uses the term ‘supplementarity’ from Of Grammatology (2016) to represent his concept, which is that the original is created through its copies or supplements. The supplement leads to more supplements, which are needed in order to create the original. This process of copying (supplements) is then what makes the original, ‘Original’, as without the copies how is the original defined? Derrida states, ‘Rather the supplement of origin: which supplements the failing origin and which is however not derived: this supplement is, as one says of a spare part, of the original make.’[9] Therefore, the copies assert the importance of the original and strengthen its position. Derrida appears to be asserting that in one way, it can be observed that the human-object relation positions humans as in command of objects because humans are the only ones that find things, create things and name things. However, it can also be explained that it is the objects which make humans complete, as without using and naming things the concept of the original or the copy (both as a result of the supplement) that humans rely on would not exist.

Derrida highlights that the name/thing binary also has an unclear master/servant relation, which produces a chicken-and-egg conundrum. In a way, it does not matter if the answer is chicken or egg, both the former and the latter are like Saussure’s idea of signifier and signified; they are two sides of the same coin. They need both to be complete; one cannot be all, only all can be one. From the human view, it is difficult to track back whether the name of the thing came before the object (through its conceptualisation/invention) or the use of an object (such as a tool) came first and then was named due to its purpose. It is difficult to clarify their different statuses. We often assume that the process is that a thing is created or found first, then humans name the thing and it becomes an object. Children name their toys, which is a taught behaviour in which we identify the toy in order to possess the thing. An example of this naming methodology is the classification model introduced by the production and use of dictionaries.